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Abstract 
 
Since the early 1990s, the number of Regional Trade Agreements has increased 
considerably across continents. This is resulting into increasing regional integration with 
substantial importance being given to cross-border connectivity development. India, a late 
subscriber of active RTA strategy, is enthusiastically venturing into cross-border connectivity 
exercises to enhance its trade integration with the neighbouring countries in recent period. 
Developing cross-border connectivity is currently receiving salience in the regional forums like 
SAARC, though limited progress has been made so far. In contrast, ASEAN is the only forum in 
Asia where substantial progress in integration through cross-border infrastructure augmentation 
has been witnessed. India has recently entered into FTA with ASEAN and is involved in several 
infrastructure augmentation projects in several ASEAN member countries. Given this 
background, the current paper seeks to analyze the Indian infrastructure development initiatives 
in the immediate and Southeastern neighborhood. The discussion covers the SAARC and 
ASEAN initiatives towards building physical infrastructure, as well as the recent aid for trade 
initiatives being undertaken in South and Southeast Asia. The paper concludes by drawing the 
lessons for SAARC members from the ASEAN experience.    
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India’s Recent Infrastructure Development Initiatives: 
A Comparative Analysis of South and Southeast Asia 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure augmentation plays an indispensable role in a country’s march towards 
socio-economic prosperity, especially for a developing country. India is no exception to this 
phenomenon. In order to maintain the GDP growth rate of around 8 per cent, and a consistent 
level of investment inflow, India is trying hard to augment its infrastructure level, in the areas 
like telecoms, roads, ports, civil aviation etc., as reflected through the recent measures.4 Apart 
from the central government initiatives, the state governments at their level also contribute in this 
regard.5   
 
In addition to the ongoing task at home, India is currently undertaking several cross-
border infrastructure development initiatives in the neighbouring countries. This is partly in view 
of India’s emerging global stature, requiring a proactive foreign policy in the neighbourhood. 
This brings South and Southeast Asia, i.e., India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood, into 
focus. To retain its rising geopolitical power status and spectacular growth performance, India 
requires a friendly neighbourhood. Hence, New Delhi is keenly crafting its foreign policy 
towards substantial engagement on the basis of mutual benefits. In addition, the created 
infrastructure can be utilized for booting both-way trade, which in long run would fulfill the 
economic objectives. In addition, the economic integration through seamless transport linkage is 
expected to facilitate FDI inflow in the region, in line with the experience of other blocs (World 
Bank, 2000).     
 
South Asia with a population of around 1.5 billion is known for instability and 
consequently less than satisfactory performance on development front. However, despite the war 
on terror and other ethnic and religious strife, the region has witnessed average annual growth of 
around 6 per cent since 2001. On the other hand, Southeast Asia’s stable and consistent internal 
development placed the region among the major growth poles of the world economy, though 
Southeast Asian economic crisis of late nineties and the recent economic recession limited the 
process to some extent. Like SAFTA, ASEAN also moved towards establishment of a Free 
Trade Area (FTA) with community-building at its core. Both the regions are currently looking 
towards deeper integration, although with differing experiences.  
 
The integration in South Asia was initiated with establishment of South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, which entered SAARC Preferential 
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) regime in 1995 and finally resulted South Asian Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA) from 2006 onwards as a culmination of the earlier efforts. However, limitations 
                                                
4  “To stimulate public investment in infrastructure, we had set up the India Infrastructure Finance 
Company Limited (IIFCL) as a special purpose vehicle for providing long term financial assistance to 
infrastructure projects.”, Budget Speech of the Finance Minister, GOI (2009-10 Budget).  
5  However there is a considerable cross-state variation in terms of budgetary allocation towards 
infrastructure development, which could be measured by percentage of total expenditure on transport 
and communication (Chakraborty and Guha, 2009).  
in the operation of SAFTA as a trade bloc still remain.6 ASEAN on the other hand was created in 
1967, and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was signed in 19927. The difference in terms of 
level of integration between SAFTA and ASEAN becomes clear from the fact that while the 
latter has jointly negotiated for entering into FTAs with several countries (e.g. Australia, China, 
India), till date no such initiative has been adopted by the former.  
 
How wide is India’s trade integration with South and Southeast Asia? First, India has 
been a key Member of SAARC and hence SAFTA since inception. Second the India-ASEAN 
FTA has come into operation since January 2010. Third, India signed a bilateral FTA with Sri 
Lanka in 1998, which entered into force in 2000. Fourth, it is currently negotiating BIMSTEC 
FTA with several neighbouring countries, which includes most of the SAARC members and 
Myanmar and Thailand from ASEAN (Chakraborty, 2008). Finally, the reform process as a part 
of the Indo-Thai FTA and Indo-Singapore CECA has already started (Chakraborty and Sengupta, 
2010). All these overlapping regional integration exercises may cumulatively provide better trade 
and development outcome with a strong push towards infrastructure development initiatives. 
India being the common denominator and the link between South and Southeast Asia has 
immense opportunity to emerge as a major economic hub, and is currently spiraling several 
major initiatives in both regions. 
 
The current paper seeks to analyze the Indian initiatives taken in the immediate and 
Southeastern neighborhood. The centrality of the paper is to understand India’s soft power 
inroads to the regions where lies its national interest. It examines the SAARC and ASEAN 
initiatives towards building physical infrastructure, which is of primary concern in the age of 
globalization. The recent aid for trade initiatives being undertaken in South and Southeast Asia 
has also been mentioned. Finally, the paper attempts to draw a comparison between SAARC and 
ASEAN experience for India and lessons learnt in the respective forums.        
 
2. Trade and Infrastructure 
 
It is often argued that India’s trade with the neighbouring countries is below its true 
potential owing to the absence of key infrastructural linkage (Sharma, 2006). In fact a substantial 
proportion of India’s trade with immediate neighbours is carried out through informal channels 
owing to the absence of well-organized infrastructure and various other reasons (Taneja, 2002, 
undated). In addition, absence of adequate infrastructural facilities leads to delay en route, 
resulting into higher per unit costs, which wipe out the cost advantages owing to tariff reduction 
as a part of trade integration exercise. In other words, the very basic purpose of FTA formation is 
defeated. On the other hand, ensuring trade across borders by building transnational 
infrastructure not only fulfills export interest but also generate regional economic dependencies 
and goodwill. Given the geographical location of India (long land borders as well as coastline), 
development of transport connectivity through rail, road and maritime services with FTA 
partners are equally important.  
                                                
6  For instance, Rodríguez-Delgado (2007) has noted that there is enough scope to reduce intra-SAFTA 
trade barriers. It is also argued by business forums that Pakistan would considerably gain by 
providing MFN status to India (Akhter, 2010), the denial of which comes from non-economic 
concerns.  
7  Vietnam joined AFTA in 1995, LAO PDR and Myanmar joined in 1997 and Cambodia joined in 
1999. 
    
Development of supporting infrastructure through economic integration is not a new 
concept in Asia. For instance, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) regional cooperation 
project in Southeast Asia is operational for more than a decade, which is responsible for 
developing the 1,500 km road link connecting the South China Sea and Indian Ocean (East-West 
Corridor). Funded by Asian Development Bank (ADB), the goal of this project has been to 
promote connectivity and market integration among Cambodia, Thailand, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Vietnam and China so as to enhance their trade potentials (WTO, 2009). The project has been 
quite successful in terms of its achievements. Another example under GMS is the Nam Theun II 
Hydropower Project ($1.45 billion) located in Lao PDR, which will export up to 5,345 GWh of 
electricity annually (95 percent of power generated) to Thailand and generate $1.9 billion in 
revenues for the host country over 25 years (Wignaraja, 2007).     
 
 In addition to GMS, ADB also supports other road infrastructure development initiatives 
in Asia. For instance, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), which covers 
Azerbaijan, the PRC (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan needs to be mentioned here. The project has also registered 
positive development repercussions in target economies (ADB, 2009). 
 
 The regional initiatives to bridge the gap in infrastructural requirement in developing 
countries and LDCs are recently being attempted multilaterally through the Aid for Trade (AFT) 
initiative. The Doha Development Agenda (2001) of the WTO stressed the need to support 
domestic efforts for mainstreaming trade into national plans for economic development and 
strategies for poverty reduction, and the focus strengthened after the Hong Kong Ministerial 
(2005). The idea of AFT is to create suitable economic environment in a country so as to enable 
it to take full advantages of the ongoing globalization process. Though AFT initiatives include 
support under various categories like trade policy and regulations, trade-related adjustments, 
building productive capacity etc., building of economic infrastructure is a major component of it. 
WTO (2009) noted that in 2007, Asia received a total AFT of US $ 10.7 billion as compared to 
US $ 9.5 billion in Africa. It is observed from Figure 1 that a significant proportion of the fund 
allocated to Asia has been unitized for creation of economic infrastructure.    
 
Figure 1: Aid for trade: regional distribution 
 
Commitments, USD Billions (2006 Constant) 
 
Source: WTO (2009) 
 
Annex 1 reports the list of the top twenty recipients of AFT support in 2006 and 2007. It 
is observed from the table that India topped the list in 2007, while the other major countries 
benefiting from the programme includes several Asian neighbours like Viet Nam, Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, China and Sri Lanka. Clearly trade infrastructure augmentation 
in Asia is receiving a major boost in recent period.  
 
 Tables 1 and 2 show India’s trade dynamics with South and Southeast Asian countries 
over the last decade. It is observed from Table 1 that India’s proportional import from SAFTA 
has decreased in 2008-09 from the 1996-97 level (less than 1 percent), though the figure has 
been higher during the interim years. A similar picture emerges in case of India’s export share to 
SAFTA countries as well, where after a decline in relative importance during late nineties; 
export share witnessed a moderate increase in 2007-08, but declined sharply during 2008-09. 
This is representative of the overall SAARC trade scenario, where intraregional trade as a 
proportion of total trade has remained small and has increased marginally from around 3 percent 
in 1985 to around 5.6 percent in recent years (WDI data). On the other hand, the proportional 
presence of ASEAN countries both in India’s export and import basket has increased over this 
period, despite its relative distance in comparison to SAFTA countries. This calls for a deeper 
analysis of the infrastructure-related policies India has followed with respect to ASEAN and 
SAFTA.  
 
3. SAARC Goals on Infrastructure 
 
The first SAARC Summit comprising the seven Heads of State from South Asia ended 
with the Dhaka Declaration (8th December 1985), which had all the good intents including 
accelerating the pace of their economic development and enhancing their national and collective 
self-reliance. However, infrastructure development received only lip service in 6th SAARC 
Summit and 8th SAARC Summit. Subsequently at the 9th SAARC Summit, the Member States 
acknowledged that inadequate intra-region communications facilities act as a major hindrance to 
closer economic co-operation. In 2002, the SAARC countries at the 11th Summit underlined the 
need for joint efforts in areas such as upgrading of infrastructure, air linkages. This focus on 
building physical connectivity came with the recognition that the South Asian region has 
immense intra-regional trade and tourism potential. 8  To realize this potential subsequently 
SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study (SRMTS) was conducted with the financial and 
technical assistance of the ADB9.  
 
At the SAARC Transport Ministers Meet in New Delhi in August 2007, several pilot sub-
regional and regional infrastructural projects were recommended, which include: linkage from 
Phuntsholing to Hashimara; Birgunj – Kaatihar – Singhabad – Rohanpur – Chittagong road 
                                                
8  SAARC Website, available at: http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?t=2.15 (last accessed on April 26, 
2010). 
9    In September 2004, ADB approved the Study of the SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport with the 
amount of $500,000 on a grant basis from ADB’s TA funding program. For details, see ADB 
website: http://www.adb.org/Documents/TA-Major-Changes-Scope/REG/38459-REG-MCS.pdf (last 
accessed on April 12, 2010). 
connectivity with links to Jogbani; rail corridor between Colombo and Chennai, Ferry Service 
between Colombo and Cochin and Colombo and Tuticorin etc. (De, 2008). 
 
On the energy front, it was acknowledged that energy needs of South Asia will increase 
three times in next fifteen to twenty years. The process of regional cooperation in energy sector 
began in January 2000 with the establishment of a Technical Committee on Energy. Thereafter, a 
specialized Working Group on Energy was created in January 2004. To cope with the energy 
deficiency issue, the First Meeting of the SAARC Energy Ministers (Islamabad, 1 October 2005) 
decided formation of an Expert Group. The Group recommended carrying out of technology 
transfer, building awareness, training, and setting up of SAARC Energy Centre at Islamabad 
which will realize the goal of regional cooperation on developing specific programs and projects 
on energy conservation and efficiency. However, a cooperative approach on this front is still 
forthcoming.10 For Instance, although SAARC countries are border economies, yet there are no 
gas pipelines crossing the national borders.11  
 
Despite the efforts made by SAARC in the last few years, the infrastructure development 
initiatives undertaken by the group seem grossly inadequate. As a result, bilateral initiatives on 
this front are receiving greater impetus. For instance, during the visit of the Bangladesh PM to 
India in January 2010, the latter proposed several infrastructural initiatives, including laying a 
new rail line from Akhaura in Bangladesh to Agartala to have a much shorter access route to 
Tripura via Bangladesh. In addition, India is considering setting up direct bus service between 
Shillong and Sylhet. This initiative along with Shillong – Dhaka air service is some 
infrastructural proposals taken up taken up by the Meghalaya Chief Minister D. D. Lapang when 
he met Bangladesh Premier Sheikh Hasina in New Delhi in January 2010.  
 
4. India’s Infrastructure Development Initiatives in South Asia 
 
Intraregional investment flows on infrastructure cooperation are still insignificant in 
SAFTA. SAARC’s missed opportunity has recently been seized by sub-regional platforms such 
as South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) program, involving four SAARC 
countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal. The four countries are grouped under the 
South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) initiative where infrastructure development in terms of 
energy and transport are priority areas. For instance, India and Bhutan are currently involved in 
energy cooperation (Sigdel, 2007). 
 
                                                
10   SAARC Website, available at: http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?t=2.2 (last accessed on March 9, 
2010). 
11  There are several ongoing negotiations over setting up of cross-border gas pipelines to deliver natural 
gas from the energy resource rich neighbouring countries to India. One such initiative is the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline, where despite long negotiations; pipeline has not materialized because of 
pricing disagreement between suppliers and India. Another major concern for India is security issue 
as the pipeline will pass through insurgency prone areas of Pakistan. The Bangladesh-India-Myanmar 
gas pipelines also suffered similar fate, considering Bangladesh’s firm stand on their demand to bring 
bilateral issues like reduction of trade imbalance, providing a corridor for Nepalese goods to 
Bangladeshi ports, perceived security threats etc.   
India’s bilateral efforts need special mention here. For instance, India has provided a line 
of credit of US$ 100 million for the refurbishment of Colombo-Matara railway corridor with 
help from IRCON and RITES (IHC, GOI, 2009). Also a joint venture for setting up a 500 MW 
coal based thermal power plant in Trincomalee has been agreed between Ceylon Electricity 
Board (CEB) and NTPC on December 2006, involving investments of US$ 500 million (Reddy, 
2006). 
 
India has also invested in a wide range of infrastructure sectors including hydro-
electricity, power transmission lines, road construction, telecommunications etc. in the new 
SAARC Member country Afghanistan (joined in 2007). For instance, construction of 220 KV 
double circuit transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul, sub-station at Kabul under the 
North-East power system project to bring power from neighbouring countries to Kabul, 
reconstruction and completion of Salma Dam Power Project in Heart, construction of 218 km 
road from Zaranj to Delaram to facilitate movement of goods between Afghanistan and Iran 
needs special mention here (SCRIBD, undated).  
 
A similar level of Indian involvement is noticed in Nepal as well. For instance, a major 
proportion of the Mahendra Raj Marg, the major highway of Nepal has been constructed by 
India. Moreover, roads from Kathmandu to Dakshinkali, Trishuli, Balaju, Godavari and Raxaul 
via Hetauda, Sunauli to Pokhara, Rajbiraj to Koshi Barrage and Janakpur etc. are built with 
Indian assistance. India has also constructed a number of bridges on these roads (SATIN, 2008). 
 
The Srinagar - Muzaffarabad bus service across the Line of Control, the West Bengal to 
Bangladesh road link through Benapole – Petrapole etc. could be cited as some of the 
achievements under SAFTA. The joint India-Iran initiative to develop the Chahbahar Port in Iran 
and to connect it by road to Afghanistan is also worth mention (Balooch, 2009). 
 
5. India’s Infrastructure Development Initiatives in Southeast Asia 
 
India’s infrastructure development initiatives in Southeast Asia are part of the larger 
Look East Policy (LEP) launched in 1991, partially caused by less than satisfactory trade 
performance within SAARC at that point. ASEAN provided a major market for Indian exports 
along with its potential to serve as a passage to enter into East Asia. The driving force behind the 
current push towards cross-border infrastructure development is the increasing growth in the 
regional trade, obtaining greater access to international markets, benefiting from increased 
synergies in production etc.  
 
Along Myanmar, India shares a land boundary of 1,643 kilometers with Southeast Asia. 
This geographical proximity was utilized to develop the 160 km India-Myanmar Friendship road 
link, connecting Tamu to Kalemyo to Kalewa, completed in 2001. Tamu is the border area on 
Myanmarese side only 5 km from Moreh, the Indian border point from where the Indian roads 
and rails are connected to other parts of the country. This strengthened the effect created by 
opening the cross border point between Moreh and Tamu in 1995 (Kuppuswamy, 2006). 
 
Kaladan Multimodal Transport is another critical project initiated in Myanmar. The 
project offers an alternative transit route for India to bypass the transport corridor of Bangladesh. 
This is a vital step, given Dhaka’s reluctance over permitting India’s accessibility to Chittagong 
port. The project involves a major upgradation of infrastructure at Sittwe, located about 250 km 
from the Mizoram border on the north-western coast of Myanmar where the Kaladan River joins 
the Bay of Bengal. The project cost is estimated at US$ 105.4 million, wherein the Indian 
contribution will be US$ 95.4 million. The Indian Government is also proposing to extend a 
credit line of US$ 10 million to the Government of Myanmar for helping out with their part of 
contribution to the project (LS, GOI, 2006).  
 
The India – Myanmar – Thailand trilateral highway under the Mekong Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC) is another important link initiated in 2005. The 1360 km Trilateral Highway 
with the cost of US$ 700 million runs from Moreh in India to Maw Sot in Thailand through 
Bagan in Myanmar. On the other hand, the Diphu – Karong – Imphal – Moreh railway track in 
India is an example of the Indian initiatives to develop internal transport infrastructure. There are 
other projects on the pipeline including construction / upgradation of Rhi – Tidim and Rhi – 
Falam road sections in Myanmar. A deep-sea port at Dawei, in Myanmar's southern tip, and the 
Dawei - Kachanaburi road that will branch off from the highway would be part of the trilateral 
highway project (IBEF, 2004). Schemes such as project specific credit lines for upgradation of 
Yangon – Mandalay Trunk line, India-sponsored optical fibre link between Moreh and Mandalay 
are on the way (MEA, GOI, 2004). 
 
India is also involved in several cross-border rail projects like Jiribam – Imphal – Moreh 
line in Manipur and the Tamu – Kalay – Segyi line in Myanmar, as well as rehabilitation of 
Myanmar's existing Segyi – Chaungu Myohaung line. All these rail linkages would ultimately 
add up to the New Delhi – Hanoi rail link proposed at the MGC Ministerial Meeting in Phnom 
Penh in June 2003. With the aim of enhancing trade under FTAs with Singapore and Thailand 
(already materialized), extended rail link from New Delhi to Hanoi was envisaged. Rail networks 
already exist in India, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, but there are several missing 
links that need to be bridged for the proper operationalization of rail link from New Delhi to 
Hanoi (RS, GOI, 2003). The proposed initiative might play an instrumental role in bridging the 
gap.  
 
India’s infrastructural initiatives with ASEAN neighbours actually provide a strong 
development impetus to the land-locked northeast region of the country. The chicken’s neck or 
the Siliguri corridor is a narrow stretch of land, which connects mainland to the northeast of 
India. This distance is over 1,600 km which is not just long but infested with geological perils 
and security threats. The development deficit in the Northeast India can be encountered by 
integrating the Northeast with the Southeast Asian region ushering in prosperity of the entire 
region (Aiyar, 2007). Over the years there has been deliberate effort on the Indian Government’s 
part to project the Northeast region as the bridge to Southeast Asia (Karthykeyan, 2009). India’s 
infrastructural ties with the Southeast Asia through the northeast can be drawn parallel with 
China’s attempt to link Xinjiang province to the neighbouring Central Asia (Clarke, 2008). 
Similar is the case of Yunnan province, where China has turned the once impoverished 
landlocked region, into a gateway to South and Southeast Asia (Nanfan Daily, 2010).  
 
It is clearly observed that over the last decade infrastructure development across borders, 
both in South and Southeast Asia emerged as a major tool of India’s economic diplomacy. 
Perhaps China’s successful experience of linking with the neighbourhood motivated India to 
extend influence as well as trade beyond borders. However, India’s success stories on cross-
border connectivity are still quite modest as compared to the Chinese experience. Also ASEAN’s 
successful march on interconnectivity and developing infrastructure (Bhattacharyay, 2009) in 
facilitating intra-region trade (Hapsari and Carlos Mangunsong, 2006) may provide a learning 
lesson for India and the SAARC.  
 
6. ASEAN Infrastructural Initiatives 
 
The ASEAN leaders realize transport and infrastructure is fundamentally linked to 
ASEAN’s political, economic (trade, tourism and investment), social and environmental well-
being.12 With the FTA integration with newer countries like China, high-quality infrastructure is 
the necessary tool to cut unnecessary costs with which ASEAN countries can provide 
competitive prices against China’s highly competitive exports. In addition, the ASEAN is aiming 
at achieving community building by 2015, which cannot be realized without a proper 
infrastructural set up and smooth physical linkages around the region. To this end, ASEAN is 
coming up with a fund to support infrastructure projects within its territories with an initial 
capital of $1 billion (Reuters, 2009).  
 
The ASEAN Leaders at the 15th ASEAN Summit held during 23-25 October 2009 in 
Cha-Am Hua Hin, Thailand adopted the Statement on ASEAN Connectivity which will serve as 
a foundation for a more enhanced East Asian connectivity. Notably, substantial progress has 
been made in the development of the ASEAN Strategic Transport Plan (ASTP) 2011-2015 that 
would support the realization of the ASEAN Connectivity and establishment of the ASEAN 
Economic Community in 2015.  
 
 Quoting the words of a former ASEAN Secretary General, “Transportation is vital to 
open up the geographical and mental space for economic growth” (Yong, 2004). Accordingly, 
ASEAN members have laid down plans for construction of transit routes across borders. Some 
ongoing road projects include: Meiktila – Loilem – Keng Tung – Tachileik (Myanmar – 
Thailand Border), Mae Sot (Thailand – Myanmar Border), Tak – Bangkok – Hin Kong – Nakhon 
Nayok – Aranyaprathet – Khlong Luek (Thailand – Cambodia Border), Nakhon Pathom – Pak 
Tho – Chumphon – Suratthani – Phattalung – Hat Yai – Sadao (Thailand – Malaysia Border), 
Chiang Rai – Chiang Khong (Thailand – Lao PDR Border) and the Poi Pet (Cambodia – 
Thailand Border) – Sisophon – Phnom Penh -  Bavet (Cambodia – Vietnam Border). Similarly, 
under the GMS three corridors are under construction, namely North-east corridor, East-West 
corridor and Southern corridor. The 1,500 km-long East-West Corridor links the key points in 
four countries: Mawlamyine – Myawaddy provinces in Myanmar, Maesot – Phitsanulok –
Khonkaen – Kalasin – Mukdahan provinces in Thailand, Savannakhet – Dansavanh in the Laos, 
and Lao Bao – Dong Ha – Hue – Danang in Vietnam (ADB, undated).  
 
The ongoing Kunming – Bangkok Highway and Singapore – Kunming Rail Link projects 
show the growing Chinese linkage with ASEAN. The 2,000 km long highway project is a part of 
the proposed Asian Highway, which is expected to lower the travelling time to 20 hours. China is 
co-financing with Thailand the construction of the Houei Sai – Chiang Khong Mekong Bridge of 
                                                
12  ASEAN website, available at: http://www.aseansec.org/21006.htm (last accessed on March 7, 2010). 
Kun Man Road (Kunming – Bangkok Highway via Lao PDR) aimed to be completed by 2011. 
The Singapore – Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) will link Kunming, the capital of the southern 
Chinese province of Yunnan, to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala 
Lumpur and then Singapore. The railway infrastructure would be completed by 2015 and will 
join the Trans-Asian Railway.13 
 
The ASEAN members, barring Laos, possess extensive coastlines and hence maritime 
transport explains majority of their trade. There has been steady implementation of measures for 
implementing an integrated and competitive maritime transport in ASEAN. There is also 
deliberation on the development of the strategy framework for the development of ASEAN 
Single Shipping Market. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation 
Relating to Marine Casualty and Marine Incident Safety Investigations by their respective 
maritime transport authorities is another step forward. These steps will strengthen intra-ASEAN 
maritime transport services and ensure globally competitive and integrated ASEAN ports and 
shipping sector by developing infrastructure, promoting a liberalised regulatory environment, 
harmonising standards and building human resource and institutional capacities (Ahmed and 
Ghani, 2007). 
 
There are issues of soft infrastructure initiatives which are required to facilitate swift and 
smooth intra-regional trade. For example, the inaugural Meeting of ASEAN Transit Transport 
Coordinating Board (TTCB) held on 5-6 November 2009 at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 
Indonesia speeds up the completion of all necessary regulatory and procedural foundations for 
the implementation of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in 
Transit (AFAFGT), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multimodal Transport (AFAMT), and 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport (AFAFIST) for 
seamless movement of goods in the region.14 
 
On the Energy sector, the ASEAN Energy Meeting (AMEM) held in Langkawi in July 
2003 was a turning point with respect to cooperation in the development and exploitation of the 
energy resource potentials in the region, as well as in attracting private sector participation and 
investment in the ASEAN energy sector. Presently, the region is looking for a Trans-ASEAN 
Gas Pipeline (TAGP) and the ASEAN Power Grid Projects to provide greater stability and 
security of energy supply in the ASEAN region. In addition, ASEAN Energy Business Forum 
(AEBF) is being built as an important platform for facilitating business interaction, technology 
exchange and project financing opportunities between ASEAN energy authorities and the private 
sector. Subsequently, ASEAN is aiming for implementation of eleven electricity interconnection 
projects by 2020 which are expected to generate potential savings of about US$ 662 million.15 
 
The ASEAN countries are conscious of their geographical limits. Therefore, there is an 
ongoing attempt to broaden the ASEAN connectivity covering South and East Asia. For 
instance, ASEAN – Republic of Korea transport cooperation is currently identifying the potential 
                                                
13  Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network was signed in 2006, 28 countries 
are parties to it. Bangladesh and Pakistan are parties, but yet to ratify.  
14   ASEAN website, available at: http://www.aseansec.org/24102.htm (last accessed on March 23, 2010). 
15   ASEAN website, available at: www.aseansec.org/ar04/CHAPTER%202-b.pdf (last accessed on 
March 9, 2010). 
transport projects and activities to be undertaken in the next 5 years16. Another significant 
partner is Japan, who has over the years emerged as the largest donor and investor in 
infrastructural projects. At present, the Manila Action Plan for the ASEAN – Japan Transport 
Partnership (AJTP) has been implemented in the area of transport logistics, safety and security, 
environment, and common infrastructure. Both players are looking forward for a new important 
initiative as a part of the Manila Action Plan, namely the Ha Noi Initiative on “ASEAN-Japan 
Action Plan on Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector (AJ-APEIT)”. The project, to 
be implemented over a five-year period from 2010 to 2014, intend to secure low-carbon and low-
pollution transport systems for achieving sustainable social and economic development. 
 
However, China has emerged as the biggest player within ASEAN in terms of trade and 
infrastructure linkages by pursuing a distinctive engagement policy in its periphery. The long-
term Chinese strategy encapsulates its integration into the ASEAN regional system. To this end, 
the Strategic Plan for ASEAN-China Transport Cooperation Plan focuses on the following 
corridors: (i) China – Myanmar – Andaman Sea, (ii) China – Lao PDR / Myanmar – Thailand – 
Malaysia – Singapore, (iii) China – Vietnam – Laos – Cambodia, (iv) Vietnam – Cambodia – 
Thailand – Myanmar, and (v) Vietnam – China – Myanmar – Bangladesh – India. In Myanmar, 
all infrastructure building and transport linkages are Chinese sponsored, including railways 
tracks within the country such as Kalemyo – Pokkaku (345 km), Nansong – Loikaw (240km) and 
Ye –Tavoy (95km). Several airfields and naval bases within ASEAN are also Chinese made.17 
China recently launched a US$ 10 billion infrastructure investment fund to improve road, 
railway, airlines and information telecommunications links between China and ASEAN and is 
providing a US$ 15 billion credit facility to promote the same. With China’s global investment 
strategy just beginning to take off, and judging from the US$ 52.1 billion in FDI outflows from 
China in 2008, there would be more investments in this sphere within ASEAN.18    
 
7. Challenges in SAARC and Lessons learnt in ASEAN 
 
The current globalization process makes the borders of the nation-states less relevant. 
Intra-regional cooperation in sectors such as infrastructure ensures large gains to all countries. A 
small yet significant example of this phenomenon is the ‘Pacific Aviation Safety Office’ 
established in Port Vila, Vanuatu, a single regional organization, replacing fragmented national 
aviation authorities in the region. The arrangement is benefiting governments, air transport 
operators and users of 7 member countries, i.e., Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.19 Could this be a replicable model for South Asia? 
                                                
16  For details see ASEAN website, ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010, available at: 
http://www.aseansec.org/16596.htm (last accessed on May 11, 2010). 
17  There are unconfirmed reports of six naval bases built by China in Myanmar’s coastline which 
includes, Sittwe, Munaung, Hainggyi, Coco Islands, Mergui, and Za Det Gyi. These ports are 
constructed to serve several Chinese interests, for example, the Sittwe port is developed for transport 
of goods to Bay of Bengal wherein prohibitive cost and commercial viability forces her to shift exit 
point to Yangon. On the other hand, Za Det Gyi port gives China access to the Indian Ocean, 
Thailand and Malacca Straits. India’s concern lies in possibility of covert underground monitoring 
facility being developed in Coco Islands aimed at monitoring activities in the Indian Ocean. 
18   ASEAN website, available at: http://www.aseansec.org/24161.htm (last accessed on April 4, 2010). 
19  For details see Pacific Aviation Safety Office Website, available at: http://www.paso.aero/ (last 
accessed on March 2, 2010). 
 
Undoubtedly, seamless transport in a geographical space which is otherwise divided by 
polity will enhance trade inter-linkage and draw more FDI than fragmented markets. The 
SAFTA experience however has so far not been able to fulfill these expectations. The recent 
Indian initiatives towards creation of infrastructure linkages with neighbours should be viewed in 
this light, which has generated a mixed outcome so far. While India’s proportional trade with 
SAFTA members as a whole has declined in 2008-09 as compared to the corresponding figures 
during late nineties (Table 1), the same has increased in case of ASEAN (Table 2), a bloc more 
successful in creating regional production networks.  
 
What is the economic or political intuition behind this scenario? A comparison of India’s 
initiatives undertaken in South and Southeast Asia (Section 4 and 5) clearly reveals that the 
participation is much deeper in case of the latter bloc as compared to the former, and perhaps 
marginal increase in the proportional presence of ASEAN countries in India’s trade basket can 
be explained in this light. Now which factor gives rise to this causality? Would it be right to 
deduce that since investment on infrastructure augmentation in general and trade infrastructure in 
particular in SAFTA members is relatively low; their trade with India is also not peaking up? Or, 
looking at the scenario from the other side of the prism, could it be concluded that India is 
investing more in the infrastructural initiatives in Southeast Asia because trade in SAFTA is in 
any case constrained by political factors? Alternatively, is it being motivated to do so by the 
growing Chinese presence (both commercial and infrastructure-oriented) in the countries 
surrounding Indian Territory (Bhattacharyya, 2010)? It seems all these factors contribute in 
shaping the recent Indian actions, and the relative strengths of each one of them would be clearly 
discernible only in the coming future.  
 
It has been noted during ADB’s 39th Annual Meeting held on 14 July 2006 at Hyderabad 
that cross border infrastructure development in the SAARC is constrained by political 
challenges, structural adjustments and fiscal imbalances. The less than potential intra-regional 
trade is explained by the high cost of doing business, originating from the lack of proper 
infrastructure. Perhaps the present political instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka explains the tentative response of bloc as a whole in bridging the 
infrastructure gap. Moreover, the leaderships in several SAARC countries are struggling for their 
own political legitimacy. Therefore, often they do not hold the mandate to aggressively pursue 
the long-term goals like regional infrastructure. Interestingly, ASEAN during its initial years 
faced similar challenges. However, the political eagerness, changing strategic dynamics of the 
Soviet Union breakup and the consequent peace in Indo-China region brought ASEAN on the 
right track and the economic implications of the deepening integration since then is obvious. 
 
Most significantly, India’s infrastructural drive towards SAARC neighbors suffers 
because the SAARC countries suffer from misperception and apprehension over India’s 
intention. In order to play a positive role and erode the existing mistrust, India needs to learn 
from Indonesia, who suffered from same problem during ASEAN’s initial years and since then 
has successfully managed to bring confidence among its regional partners.  
 
Lack of long term vision is another shortcoming facing SAARC countries. The regional 
infrastructural initiatives required the genesis of single, unified geographical and economic unit 
in South Asia. In practice, several SAARC countries are still struggling to ensure internal 
demands in terms of basic rights (e.g. UN Millennium Development Agenda). Building 
infrastructure across borders is quite ambitious in this perspective, in particular given the limited 
trade potential of several LDCs of the region. Nataraj (2007) has noted that the other persistent 
problem with the SAARC countries is a vicious cycle of inefficiency.  
    
Apart from boosting trade, developing connectivity linkages in South Asia has the 
potential to address the problem of growing energy insecurity of the region. For instance, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan can serve as the gateway to Central Asian energy source. Similarly, 
with proper infrastructure in place, the natural gas reserves in Bangladesh could be the growth 
engine for the neighbouring SAARC countries. Once the physical connectivity integrates the 
region, this will add benefits to the land-locked countries (Bhutan, Nepal) of the region. Cross-
border management of water resource is another area that can be taken up under SAARC banner. 
This will generate irrigation and hydro-power related benefits in one country while ensuring 
flood control for the neighbouring one. For example, India – Nepal, India – Bangladesh, and 
Afghanistan – Pakistan can effectively reap the benefits of cooperation in water storage and 
management issue. However, as evident from the current scenario, sorting problems of mutual 
mistrust needs to precede that eventuality. 
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Table 1: India’s Trade with SAFTA Countries (% share in India’s export and import basket) 
 
Export Import Countries 
1996-97 1997-98 2001-02 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 1996-97 1997-98 2001-02 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Afghanistan  0.0679 0.0611 0.0556 0.1438 0.1528 0.2169 0.0078 0.0258 0.0341 0.0186 0.0434 0.0431
Bangladesh   2.5962 2.2609 2.2867 1.2883 1.7905 1.3461 0.1590 0.1225 0.1150 0.1230 0.1022 0.1032
Bhutan  0.0657 0.0383 0.0173 0.0455 0.0532 0.0606 0.0863 0.0324 0.0465 0.0761 0.0773 0.0500
Maldives  0.0310 0.0251 0.0613 0.0544 0.0550 0.0702 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0016 0.0016 0.0013
Nepal  0.4951 0.4889 0.4893 0.7348 0.9245 0.8511 0.1637 0.2294 0.6923 0.1647 0.2497 0.1641
Pakistan   0.4697 0.4115 0.3286 1.0680 1.1934 0.7769 0.0924 0.1071 0.1260 0.1740 0.1145 0.1214
Sri Lanka   1.4264 1.4064 1.4395 1.7850 1.7342 1.2959 0.1095 0.0728 0.1311 0.2534 0.2510 0.1181
Total 5.1520 4.6922 4.6783 5.1198 5.9036 4.6177 0.6191 0.5906 1.1458 0.8114 0.8397 0.6012
Source: India’s Trade data (Ministry of Commerce) 
 
 
Table 2: India’s Trade with ASEAN Countries (%share in India’s export and import basket) 
 
Export Import Countries 
1996-97 1997-98 2001-02 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 1996-97 1997-98 2001-02 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Brunei  0.0180 0.0065 0.0084 0.0066 0.0064 0.0095 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.1536 0.0898 0.1369
Cambodia  0.0047 0.0085 0.0258 0.0413 0.0328 0.0256 0.0000 0.0037 0.0022 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009
Indonesia  1.7683 1.2571 1.2178 1.6050 1.3254 1.3771 1.5257 1.7636 2.0166 2.2445 1.9184 2.2374
Lao PDR  0.0011 0.0009 0.0072 0.0019 0.0024 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002
Malaysia  1.5869 1.4085 1.7653 1.0322 1.5761 1.8769 2.8194 2.8418 2.2048 2.8505 2.3882 2.3713
Myanmar  0.1350 0.1418 0.1389 0.1108 0.1138 0.1211 0.4528 0.5400 0.7283 0.4213 0.3220 0.3085
Philippines  0.5487 0.6863 0.5654 0.4610 0.3798 0.4019 0.0420 0.0556 0.1845 0.0901 0.0814 0.0848
Singapore  2.9204 2.2266 2.2185 4.8028 4.5226 4.4908 2.1494 2.4154 2.5365 2.9554 3.2285 2.5146
Thailand  1.3358 0.9858 1.4446 1.1430 1.1098 1.0376 0.5039 0.5462 0.8229 0.9398 0.9151 0.8987
Vietnam   0.3528 0.3640 0.4978 0.7776 0.9836 0.9455 0.0043 0.0211 0.0368 0.0903 0.0690 0.1355
 Total 8.6717 7.0860 7.8897 9.9822 10.0527 10.2913 7.4976 8.1874 8.5334 9.7466 9.0135 8.6888
Source: India’s Trade data (Ministry of Commerce) 
Annex 1: Top 20 Recipients of Aid for Trade in Volume in 2007 Commitments, USD 
Million (2006 constant prices) 
 
Country Region Income Group 
2002-05 
Average 2006 2007 
Share 
(%) of 
total 
AFT 
ODA as 
% of 
GNI 
India Asia Other Low Income 1352.3 1522.6 1963.8 7.7 0.11
Viet Nam Asia Other Low Income 1371.9 1154.1 1673.9 6.6 3.58
Afghanistan Asia Least Developed 665.0 1168.2 1341.2 5.3 33.86
Iraq Asia 
Lower Middle 
Income 1979.2 2061.8 1111.0 4.4 – 
Ethiopia Africa Least Developed 485.1 655.4 813.6 3.2 12.48
Indonesia Asia 
Lower Middle 
Income 986.9 814.4 772.6 3.0 0.19
Kenya Africa Other Low Income 300.0 294.1 735.0 2.9 4.31
Ghana Africa Other Low Income 235.6 207.1 667.1 2.6 7.59
Bangladesh Asia Least Developed 642.1 459.7 655.8 2.6 2.06
Mali Africa Least Developed 159.5 79.6 653.3 2.6 15.43
Uganda Africa Least Developed 221.2 105.4 640.8 2.5 15.72
Egypt Africa 
Lower Middle 
Income 518.5 701.3 469.8 1.8 0.84
Pakistan Asia Other Low Income 345.8 322.5 408.2 1.6 1.51
Tanzania Africa Least Developed 324.2 213.0 398.1 1.6 17.43
El Salvador America 
Lower Middle 
Income 27.0 23.8 369.8 1.5 0.45
Mozambique Africa Least Developed 284.2 316.9 365.3 1.4 26.33
China Asia 
Lower Middle 
Income 695.4 537.5 338.8 1.3 0.04
Sri Lanka Asia 
Lower Middle 
Income 410.9 281.7 285.1 1.1 1.84
Morocco Asia 
Lower Middle 
Income 280.6 433.5 265.0 1.0 1.51
Bolivia America 
Lower Middle 
Income 215.6 115.4 259.0 1.0 3.69
Source: WTO (2009) 
 
 
